MyWire Home Advanced Search
Foreign Policy

Think Again: Iran

Tehran's desire for a nuclear bomb has put it in Washington's cross hairs. But neither President George W. Bush's repeated condemnations of Iran's clerical rulers, nor the threat of military force will advance the cause of democracy
Print article Save Email Share Share Comment Be the First to Comment
“If Iran Gets a Nuclear Bomb, Iran Will Use It”

Very unlikely. Let's assume that the Iranians have a nuclear weapons program. What do they intend to do with it? Iran almost certainly does not intend to brandish a nuclear bomb in an attempt to intimidate its regional enemy, Israel, or its global nemesis, the United States. Such belligerence could be catastrophic for the Islamic Republic. Iran's clerical leaders govern a country with little revolutionary zeal and a fundamentally unsound economy dependent on oil revenues. Iran's economy cannot withstand the sanctions that would come with nuclear gunslinging. Furthermore, the clerics have blessed a partial détente with their Arab neighbors and with the European Union (EU), whose major powers (Britain, France, and Germany) are engaged in delicate negotiations with Iran. The clerics are in no mood to give up the economic and diplomatic benefits of these relationships.

If Iran wanted nuclear technology for peaceful uses, it is fair to ask, why did it hide efforts to get that technology? The Iranians argue that alerting the world to its nuclear acquisitions would have allowed the United States to block its supply lines. That may be true, but there is another possible explanation: Iran hid its interest in nuclear technology because that interest was military in nature. There is plausible circumstantial evidence—most of it collected by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)—to suggest that Iran's nuclear program is not purely civilian. For more than 10 years, Iran concealed important changes to its nuclear inventory and maintained a clandestine procurement effort. Some of Iran's actions violated the explicit terms of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT); others flouted its spirit. The IAEA's failure to find hard evidence that Iran is trying to weaponize its nuclear technology does not mean that there is no such effort.

But Iran's nuclear ambiguity is calculated, a reaction to the vulnerability it feels. Iran probably intends to gather all the elements necessary for bomb making, so that it can go nuclear the moment that it feels a U.S. or Israeli attack is imminent. In the meantime, Iranian officials brag—speciously, some argue—of their “mastery” of nuclear fuel-cycle technology. As one senior State Department official put it, “The Iranians don't necessarily have to have a successful nuclear program … they merely have to convince us, others, and their neighbors that they do.”

“Iran Has No Use for Nuclear Power”

False. Iran is the second-largest oil producer in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries and has the world's second-largest natural gas reserves. But its energy needs are rising faster than its ability to meet them. Driven by a young population and high oil revenues, Iran's power consumption is growing by around 7 percent annually, and its capacity must nearly triple over the next 15 years to meet projected demand.

Where will the electricity come from? Not from the oil sector. It is retarded by U.S. sanctions, as well as inefficiency, corruption, and Iran's institutionalized distrust of Western investors. Since 1995, when the sector was opened to a handful of foreign companies, Iran has added 600,000 barrels per day to its crude production, enough to offset depletion in aging fields, but not enough to boost output, which has stagnated at around 3.7 million barrels per day since the late 1990s. Almost 40 percent of Iran's crude oil is consumed locally. If this figure were to rise, oil revenues would fall, spelling the end of the strong economic growth the country has enjoyed since 1999. Plugging the gap with natural gas is not possible—yet. Iran's gigantic gas reserves are only just being tapped, so Iran remains a net importer.

The main goal of Iranian foreign policy is to counter U.S. efforts to isolate it. This partly explains the ambitious agreement that Iran and China signed last year, under which China may buy as much as $70 billion of Iranian liquefied natural gas over the next 30 years, while developing a large Iranian oil field. It is no accident that the agreement was with a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council, which the United States would like to use to sanction Iran for its nuclear activities. Iran is also schmoozing other influential Asian countries with energy deals, particularly Japan and India. It makes sense for Iran to free up its hydrocarbons for export, but why pour money into a hugely expensive nuclear fuel-cycle program when other nations have said they will sell Iran the nuclear fuel that it needs? Iran contends that the United States may pressure foreign sellers into stopping the flow. This is unconvincing: Those very same foreigners buy its oil and pledge to buy its gas in the face of American disapproval. Iran's desire for a complete fuel cycle is the most suspicious aspect of its nuclear program.

“The Iranian People Support Their Leaders' Nuclear Program”

Not really. Iranians who vocally support their country's nuclear ambitions tend to be strong supporters of the Islamic Republic, and they are a minority. In today's sullenly depoliticized Iran, it is the mundane issues that animate people: the price of staple products, for instance, or changes in the terms of required military service. In the four and a half years that I have lived in Iran, I have been present at impromptu debates by normal Iranians on these and other humdrum topics, but only rarely have I heard discussions about national strategy or Iran's geopolitics. I have never witnessed a spontaneous discussion of the nuclear program among average Iranians.

True, the few opinion polls that have been commissioned, mostly by organs close to Iran's conservative establishment, found strong public support for the country's declared goal of becoming a nuclear fuel producer. But there is good reason to be skeptical about their findings. It would be quite remarkable if a populace increasingly disengaged from politics were suddenly energized by something as arcane as nuclear fuel and its byproducts. Iran's educated urbanites are mostly aware of the nuclear issue, but they are emphatic in their disdain for politics and politicians.

It's unlikely that many Iranians would be willing to put up with the economic and diplomatic isolation that would likely result if Iran insisted on enriching uranium. And the Islamic Republic would hesitate to ask them to do so, for it is the regime, not the international community, that would feel the backlash.

“Only the Threat of Force Can Dissuade Iran from Advancing with Its Nuclear Plans”

Doubtful. The threat of imminent force might cause Iran to back down, but it could also have the opposite effect, encouraging Iran to leave the NPT and to develop a nuclear weapon as fast as possible.

The United States and Israel have reacted aggressively to official Iranian statements suggesting it will never abandon its goal of achieving a nuclear fuel cycle. But these countries do not have official relations with Iran and have little opportunity to judge the sincerity of the statements. In private, both Iranian and foreign officials acquainted with the European negotiations say that Iran is more flexible than it appears. In the words of one well-connected Iranian conservative, “The fuel cycle is not an article of faith, but a card to play.”

What does Iran hope to gain from playing this card? According to Iranian officials I have spoken with, Iran would revise its nuclear plans if the United States abandoned its policy of undermining the Islamic Republic and its clerical rulers and started lifting economic sanctions. Ultimately, the Islamic Republic might refuse to publicly relinquish its nuclear goals, preferring instead to extend the current negotiations indefinitely. If major incentives accompanied a credible threat of severe consequences, however, it is hard to imagine the clerics actually carrying out their threat to restart their enrichment activities.

“U.S. Military Action Would Embolden Dissidents to Topple the Islamic Republic”

0 COMMENTS
ON THIS ARTICLE


BE THE FIRST TO COMMENT

COMMENTING RULES & FAQ
Insert Quote Insert Hyperlink Insert Text Bold
3950
Characters Left
Preview
Cancel